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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In March of 2011, AT&T announced that it would buy T-Mobile USA. In

*John Soma is a professor of law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Professor Soma is
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August of that year, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a suit to stop the
2
purchase. After four months of obstacles and setbacks, AT&T announced that it
3
was withdrawing its bid. The DOJ had won this time. The DOJ does not,
however, always succeed when challenging high profile mergers. In 2003, Oracle
4
initiated its tender offer for PeopleSoft, and the DOJ filed suit to halt the purchase.
5
Oracle was not dissuaded, went to trial with the DOJ, and the DOJ lost.
As these two mergers indicate, the outcomes of cases concerning Section 7
6
of the Clayton Act are no longer predictable. If the interpretation of Section 7 was
predictable, AT&T would not have pursued T-Mobile, in which the deal fell apart

also the Executive Director of the University of Denver Privacy Foundation. After completing his Ph.D.
in Economics in 1975, Soma served from 1976 to 1979 as trial attorney for the U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Washington, D.C., where he was primarily assigned to the Department of
Justice trial team in the United States v. IBM litigation. In 1979, he joined the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law faculty. In addition to seven books, Soma has authored more than forty
professional articles in the antitrust and computer law area. My thanks to Daniel Graham for his
extensive help on this article. All views, opinions, as well as any errors, are of course, the author’s.
1
Paul Barbagallo, DOJ Moves to Block AT&T-T-Mobile Merger; AT&T Vows ‘Vigorous’ Court
Fight on Issue, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.dailyreport.bna.com/drpt/display/
batch_print_display.adp. AT&T and other wireless phone companies have consistently complained that
the wireless phone industry is suffering from a lack of spectrum (the airwaves upon which wireless
phone signals travel), and AT&T claimed that this shortage was forcing it to purchase T-Mobile to
acquire the spectrum it needs. See Defendant’s Answer at 2, United States v. AT&T, Inc., (D.D.C.,
Dec. 20, 2011) (No. 11-CV-01560), 2011 WL 3966103; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO11-352, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT: NTIA PLANNING AND PROCESSES NEED STRENGTHENING TO
PROMOTE THE EFFICIENT USE OF SPECTRUM BY FEDERAL AGENCIES 35–36 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/318264.pdf; Brian X. Chen, AT&T: We Need Spectrum or Prices Are
Going Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/att-fcc/
(“Smartphones and tablets are squeezing data networks. And because of the limited amount of
spectrum available to expand wireless services, the nation may face a data network shortage in the
coming years.”); Gina Chon, Anton Troianovski & Anupreeta Das, AT&T Hunts Spectrum, WALL ST. J.
(Feb.
16,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577225611179231968.html
(discussing
AT&T’s need to find a new source of spectrum after its deal with T-Mobile fell apart and as consumers’
demand for mobile data increases).
2
Michael J. De La Merced, Jeffrey Cane & Ben Protess, U.S. Moves to Block AT&T Merger with
T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/u-s-moves-to-blockatt-merger-with-t-mobile/ (describing the DOJ’s complaint, which contended that “AT&T’s elimination
of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced rival would remove a significant competitive force from the
market.”).
3
See Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile/.
4
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
5
Id. at 1175–76; see also Steve Lohr & Laurie J. Flynn, Judge Allows Oracle to Bid for
PeopleSoft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/technology/
10soft.html?pagewanted=all (“A federal judge ruled yesterday that Oracle, the nation’s second-largest
software company, could proceed with its hostile bid for PeopleSoft, handing the Justice Department a
rare defeat in a legal challenge to a corporate merger.”).
6
15 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); see E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and
Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1606–07
(2004) (describing the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence that occurred in General Dynamics and the
resulting increased difficulty for the DOJ to win an antitrust case); see also United States v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510–11 (1974); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301
(1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“In a single sentence and an omnibus footnote at the close of its
opinion, the Court pronounces its work consistent with the line of our decisions under [Section] 7 since
the passage of the 1950 amendment. The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under
[Section] 7, the Government always wins.”).

2013

LESSONS FROM AT&T’S FLOP

197

7

and AT&T ended up losing a $4 billion breakup fee. Obviously it is too late for
AT&T to avoid the mistakes it made as it attempted to buy T-Mobile. There are
lessons to be learned. A comparison of AT&T’s unsuccessful purchase of TMobile with Oracle’s successful purchase of PeopleSoft reveals the elements of a
successful approach to large-scale mergers. By comparing these two deals, legal
counsel to companies that are pursuing, or are contemplating pursuing, a largescale acquisition can learn the current, successful elements to approach growth by
acquisition.
This article sets forth the lessons to be learned from the comparison of these
two deals. Part I sets out an explanation of Section 7 case law, and Part II
describes the outcomes of the Oracle trial and the AT&T failed purchase. Part III
describes the lessons that can be learned from this comparison. Based on these
lessons, Part IV makes recommendations for companies seeking to grow and avoid
an AT&T outcome.
II. SECTION 7 LAW
1. The Statute
The “ultimate question” in a Section 7 analysis is “whether the effect of the
8
merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ in the relevant market.” In
order to make this determination, courts have to establish two foundational
concepts relating to the merger. Courts must first establish the relevant product
9
market—what the parties are selling. Courts must also establish the relevant
10
geographic market—where the parties are competing.
After answering these
fundamental questions, the courts can then consider whether the merger or
acquisition will substantially lessen competition. Courts do this by considering
11
how much market share the combined firm will possesses and whether future
12
competition in the industry is likely to decrease due to the merger.

7
See Jenna Wortham, AT&T In $6.7 Billion Loss on Failure of T-Mobile Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
26,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/technology/atts-net-loss-tied-to-t-mobile-mergerfees.html (describing AT&T’s $4 billion breakup fee and other losses associated with its attempted
purchase of T-Mobile).
8
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)
(“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”).
9
See, e.g., Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356 (defining the product market as the “relevant product
or services market” in which the merging companies compete).
10
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336–39 (1962).
11
See, e.g., id. at 343–44.
12
See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497–98 (1974) (emphasizing the
importance of a showing of “anticompetitive effects” in order for the government to establish a Section
7 violation).
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2. The Classic Cases
A. Brown Shoe Company
The first case that dealt with a Section 7 violation after the 1950 amendment
13
was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, in which two shoe companies—G.R.
14
Kinney Company and Brown Shoe Company—sought to merge.
The Court
15
evaluated the merger based on two main factors: (1) the product market, and (2)
16
the geographic market.
After defining the product market and the geographic
market, the Court determined what percentage of this market Brown and Kinney
17
would control post merger.
Based on this degree of market share, the Court
determined that the merger “may tend to lessen competition substantially in the
retail sale of men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes in the overwhelming majority”
18
of towns where Brown and Kinney had shoe stores. The Court also indicated
that “tendency toward concentration in the industry” was another factor that
19
weighed in favor of blocking the Brown-Kinney merger. Given the shoe industry
had a demonstrated trend toward concentration, the Court affirmed the lower
court’s holding and found that the merger would substantially lessen competition
20
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
B. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
The Court’s next noteworthy Section 7 case was United States v.
21
Philadelphia National Bank, which arose when Philadelphia National Bank
22
sought to merge with Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank (“Girard”). After the
Comptroller of the Currency approved the merger, but before the banks moved
forward to finalize the merger, the United States brought suit to stop the
23
combination.
In its analysis, the Court determined that the relevant product

13

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 296.
15
Id. at 335–36 (establishing the product market as men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes because
this was the market within which the two companies actually competed).
16
Id. at 336 (concluding that the relevant geographic market was comprised of towns with
populations greater than 10,000, and their “immediate contiguous surrounding territory” where both
Brown and Kinney had retail stores because this definition covered the area where the merging
companies competed).
17
Id. at 343–44 (stating that the combined shoe company would control over 57% of the woman’s
shoe market in one city, and 5% of the market share over the entire geographic area). The Court stated
that even though 5% of a market share may not seem like a large share, it can be a damaging share
when it is held by a large national chain. Id. at 344–45.
18
Id. at 346.
19
Id. at 344–45 (“Other factors to be considered in evaluating the probable effects of a merger in
the relevant market lend additional support to the District Court’s conclusion that this merger may
substantially lessen competition. One such factor is the history of tendency toward concentration in the
industry.”).
20
Id. at 346.
21
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
22
Id. at 323.
23
Id. at 330–34 (stating that the government alleged that the merger would result in concentration
within the commercial banking industry and that concentration would have adverse effects on
14
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market was commercial banking, including checking accounts, savings accounts,
24
and loans. The Court next determined that the relevant geographic market was
25
the four-county region including and surrounding Philadelphia. The appropriate
test to apply in geographic market determination was “where, within the area of
competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and
26
immediate.”
Philadelphia National Bank and Girard only had branches in the
four-county region around Philadelphia and because consumers sought nearby
(convenient) banking options, the Court decided that this four-county region was
27
the correct geographic market.
After making these two foundational determinations, the Court moved to
28
assess the effect of the merger on competition. The Court added a new analytical
29
twist to the Section 7 analysis established in Brown Shoe by establishing a
presumption in favor of finding a Section 7 violation based on the percentage of
30
market share enjoyed by the merged companies after the merger. The Court then
decided that if the Philadelphia National Bank-Girard merger went through, the
combined bank would control “at least 30% of the commercial banking business in
31
the four-county Philadelphia metropolitan area.” The Court did not say at what
percentage of control a company passed the threshold into the realm of the
anticompetitive presumption, but the Court stated that 30% control was enough to
32
trigger the presumption. After these two premier cases, there developed a strong
33
trend of courts ruling in the government’s favor. Up until the outcome in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., it was hard for the government to lose a Section
34
7 case.

competition).
24
Id. at 356–57 (stating that “the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as
checking accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term ‘commercial banking,’ composes a
distinct line of commerce.”) (citation omitted).
25
Id. at 361.
26
Id. at 357 (citing BETTY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS 42 (1960)).
27
Id. at 358–59.
28
Id. at 362 (“Having determined the relevant market, we come to the ultimate question under
[Section] 7: whether the effect of the merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ in the relevant
market.”).
29
Id. at 362–63.
30
Id. at 363 (“[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”).
31
Id. at 364.
32
Id.
33
See Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 51–52 (2004) (“[F]ollowing 1950,
the Supreme Court interpreted the amended [S]ection 7 in such a manner that antitrust authorities were
granted the power to challenge even the most incipient of concentrations.”).
34
See id.; see also United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (“In a single sentence and an omnibus footnote at the close of its opinion, the Court
pronounces its work consistent with the line of our decisions under [Section] 7 since the passage of the
1950 amendment. The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the
Government always wins.”) (emphasis added).
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C. General Dynamics
After a long trend of winning their Section 7 appeals, the government lost in
35
General Dynamics. In this case, the government challenged General Dynamics’s
36
acquisition of a coal mining company, United Electric Coal Companies.
The government sought to prove its case in the same way it had won its
previous cases—by showing evidence that the coal industry’s number of
competitors was decreasing and the merger resulted in a greater market share for
37
General Dynamics.
In this case the Court, however, did not accept this
38
reasoning. In contrast with prior cases where the Court had found this reasoning
to be persuasive, here the Court upheld the District Court’s determination that the
statistics relied upon by the government only indicated the nature of the past
competitive nature of the industry and were not indicative of the future competitive
39
nature of the industry. The acquired company, United Electric Coal Companies,
had depleting coal resources and most of its production had already been allocated
to long-term contracts, and thus, the Court held that the government’s evidence
failed to show that the merger would have a future negative impact on
40
competition.
3. The DOJ Merger Guidelines

41

In addition to case law, the Horizon Merger Guidelines (the “Guidelines”)
42
have had a significant impact on the outcome of antitrust cases. The Guidelines
are “intended to assist the business community and antitrust practitioners by
increasing the transparency of the analytical process underlying the Agencies’
43
enforcement decisions.”
The Guidelines describe how the DOJ and FTC (the
44
“Agencies”) define the relevant product market. The Agencies evaluate whether
two merging firms have products that compete with each other and whether there
45
are substitutes for that product.
By evaluating the competition between the

35

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510–11 (1974).
Id. at 488–89. Note that, technically, the acquiring company had been Material Service
Corporation. Id. However, by the time of this decision, Material Service Corporation had been bought
by General Dynamics Corporation. Id. at 489.
37
See id. at 494, 496.
38
Id. at 503–04; see also Paul Cowling, An Earthy Enigma: The Role of Localism in the Political,
Cultural and Economic Dimensions of Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
257, 280–81 (2005) (describing the shift in General Dynamics Corp. as a shift away from politics
toward functionality in the Court’s antitrust analysis).
39
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 503–04.
40
Id. at 502–04.
41
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. The DOJ and the FTC jointly
promulgated these Guidelines. Id.
42
See Amanda J. Parkison Hassid, An Oracle Without Foresight? Plaintiffs’ Arduous Burdens
Under U.S. v. Oracle, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 893–94 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines have been a persuasive
force since their enactment, and any radical departure from them constitutes a major policy shift.”).
43
Id. at 1. “The unifying theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to
create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.” Id. at 2.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id.
36
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merging companies’ competing products, the Agencies can start to determine
whether the proposed merger will be beneficial or harmful for competition
46
involving that product. The Guidelines also discuss the geographic market. The
purpose of this evaluation is to determine the geographic limits of the competition
47
relating to the product market.
Factors that affect the geographic market
48
determination include transportation costs, language, regulation, and tariffs.
After discussing product market and geographic market, the Guidelines treat
the topic of concentration in the market by various tools including the Herfindahl49
Hirschman Index (“HHI”).
The Agencies’ Guidelines set thresholds of
50
concentration at which market dominance is presumed.
The Agencies’
Guidelines also state that the Agencies evaluate a merger based upon the change in
51
the HHI that it produces. While these thresholds are not strictly adhered to, they
52
do provide general guidance.
The Guidelines also indicate that the Agencies will look beyond product
53
markets, geographic markets, and HHI numbers to consider other factors.
Notably, the Guidelines emphasize a proposed merger’s effect on innovation in the
54
industry. This is an important consideration because there is the potential that a
combination of two key players in an industry will remove the combined firm’s
motivation to create new products and designs because the level of competition
that it is facing has decreased with the removal of a strong competitor. The
Guidelines also emphasize that the Agencies have wide latitude to act to prevent
55
mergers that will have anticompetitive effects.
These Guidelines and classic
cases make up the legal backdrop for both Oracle’s and AT&T’s recent attempts to
grow, and they will help explain why Oracle succeeded and AT&T did not.

46

Id. at 13.
Id. (“The arena of competition affected by the merger may be geographically bounded if
geography limits some customers’ willingness or ability to substitute to some products, or some
suppliers’ willingness or ability to serve some customers.”).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 18–19. HHI is used to measure market concentration. Id. Under the index, market
concentration numbers are calculated by squaring then summing all market participants’ market share
percentages. Id. at 18. So the smaller the individual market shares of the market participants, the
smaller the HHI. Id. at 19. Conversely, the larger the market share of a market participant, the larger
the HHI. See id. at 18–19; see also United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 71–72
(D.C.C. 2011) (providing an explanation and examples of HHI calculations).
50
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 19 (indicating that a market is
not concentrated when its HHI is below 1500, moderately concentrated when its HHI is between 1500
and 2500, and highly concentrated when its HHI is above 2500).
51
Id. (changes less than 100 “are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects,” changes of greater
than 100 in a “moderately concentrated market” “raise significant competitive concerns and often
warrant scrutiny,” while an increase of greater than 200 in a “highly concentrated market” “will be
presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”).
52
See id.
53
Id. at 20–34.
54
Id. at 23 (“Competition often spurs firms to innovate.”).
55
See id. at 1 (“[The] Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger enforcement should
interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is
seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”).
47
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III. WINNERS AND LOSERS: ORACLE AND AT&T
1. Oracle Bests the DOJ
In United States v. Oracle, Oracle went to trial with the DOJ over its
56
proposed purchase of PeopleSoft and won.
Both Oracle and PeopleSoft
57
produced software called “enterprise resource planning” software.
In its
complaint, the DOJ attempted to narrow the product market to a specific type of
“enterprise resource planning” software characterized as high function software
relating to both “human relations management” and “financial management
58
systems.” In its complaint, the government argued that only Oracle, PeopleSoft,
59
and one other company produced these two types of high function software.
Allowing Oracle and PeopleSoft to merge, therefore, would result in
60
anticompetitive effects in this corner of the software market. The district court
61
was not persuaded by the government’s narrow product market definition.
It
stated that it was not convinced that if the Oracle-PeopleSoft merger were allowed
to go forward, consumers would have no option “but to submit to a small but
62
significant non-transitory price increase by the merged entity.” Rather the court
found that consumers would be able to choose from substitute products, thus
eliminating or at least significantly limiting, the merged entity’s monopoly
63
power.
With regard to the geographic market, the government attempted to have the
64
Arguably, the government urged this
court limit it to the United States.
geographic market definition to make one of Oracle and PeopleSoft’s
65
competitors—SAP—appear smaller.
The court, however, found that the
geographic market was the worldwide market because competition for this type of
66
software was not limited to the United States. Rather, foreign-based companies
and U.S.-based companies compete worldwide for business relating to this type of
67
software. In regard to market concentration, the court had no applicable statistics
to consider because the government had only provided statistics based on their

56

United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098,1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1101. This type of software “integrates most of an entity’s data across all or most of the
entity’s activities.” Id.
58
Id. at 1101–03.
59
Id. at 1107.
60
See id.
61
Id. at 1131–32, 1158.
62
Id. at 1132. In its evaluation of the government’s product market definition, the court discussed
at length the various witnesses that testified on the government’s behalf in an attempt to help
substantiate the government’s product market definition. Id. at 1131. Unfortunately for the
government, the court did not find many of these witnesses to be credible. Id. at 1132.
63
See id. at 1159–61 (citing outsourcing possibilities, mid-market vendors, and Microsoft ERP
products as possible substitutes for the merged entity’s ERP product).
64
Id. at 1161.
65
Id. at 1162.
66
Id. at 1164–65 (finding that although relationships are important in the sale of ERP, competition
for this product is not limited to the United States, just like competition in other product markets that
involve relationships is not limited to the United States).
67
Id.
57
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product market definition, which was not accepted by the court. The court also
69
considered the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger.
70
Lastly, the court considered Oracle’s increased efficiencies defense. Here,
Oracle argued that the merger would allow it cost savings, and would allow it to
pursue greater innovations because it would have a larger customer base and
71
greater revenue. The court found these efficiencies arguments to be speculative
72
and unsubstantiated. The court, however, found in favor of Oracle because the
government had failed to carry its burden of showing that the proposed merger was
likely to substantially “lessen competition in a relevant product and geographic
73
market.”
74
First, the DOJ lost, and
This case struck two blows against the DOJ.
second, the court articulated a standard that calls for the government to show a
75
“likely” substantial lessening of competition when proving a Section 7 violation.
This is not the standard that the government wants. Its Guidelines highlight that
that the language of Section 7 emphasizes possibilities and not certainties when it
76
comes to proving a Section 7 violation. Before AT&T’s attempt to purchase TMobile, Oracle was the last major antitrust showdown for the DOJ.

2. AT&T Withdraws Its Bid
Unlike Oracle, AT&T did not get the better of the DOJ. AT&T announced
77
its proposed purchase of T-Mobile in March of 2011. In August of that year, the
78
DOJ filed suit to stop the merger. AT&T continued to push forward, but it met a
back-breaking obstacle when the FCC appeared ready to stall the deal. In order for
79
the purchase to go forward, AT&T had to obtain FCC approval.
In April of

68

Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1165–76. Here, the court focused on the government’s evidence regarding (1) coordinated
effects and (2) unilateral effects. Id. The court determined that the government had not proven either
of these claims. Id. at 1175.
70
Id. at 1173–75; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 29
(describing the possibility that a merged entity will be able to achieve greater efficiencies due to its
larger size and therefore provide better products, better service, and other benefits to consumers).
71
Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1173–74.
72
Id. at 1175 (“The court finds Oracle’s evidence on the claimed cost-savings efficiency to be
flawed and unverifiable.”).
73
Id. at 1175–76.
74
The DOJ decided not to make the situation even worse and chose not to appeal to the Ninth
Circuit out of fear the District Court’s factual rulings would negatively impact any Ninth Circuit
appealed decision. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Appeal
Oracle Decision (Oct. 1, 2004).
75
See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1175–76.
76
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 1.
77
Back to the Future for AT&T, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011, 8:42 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/back-to-the-future-for-att/ (describing AT&T’s bid to buy TMobile).
78
De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2 (describing the challenge by the DOJ to AT&T’s
attempt to purchase T-Mobile because “AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced
rival would remove a significant competitive force from the market.”).
79
Jim Puzzanghera, FCC Allows AT&T to Withdraw Application to Purchase T-Mobile, L.A.
69
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2011, AT&T filed its application with the FCC, seeking permission to merge with
80
T-Mobile. AT&T encountered more push back from the FCC than it expected
because, after learning that the FCC Chairman wanted to thoroughly review the
proposed merger with a “rare, trial-like hearing,” AT&T withdrew its application
81
for FCC approval. It seemed that AT&T wanted to focus on the opposition it
was facing from the DOJ and then worry about the FCC after it won in court or
82
was able to settle with the DOJ. Even though the FCC initially appeared like it
was not going to let AT&T withdraw its application without prejudice, it
83
eventually did allow AT&T to withdraw without prejudice.
Despite being
allowed to withdraw its application, this setback from the FCC was the beginning
of the end for AT&T’s bid for T-Mobile.
After the FCC setback, the DOJ argued that “without an F.C.C. application
there was no [deal] for the government to oppose” because AT&T needed FCC
84
approval to carry out its merger. The DOJ then wanted to withdraw its lawsuit
until the FCC application was resubmitted and there actually was a deal to
85
oppose.
The judge agreed with the DOJ and scheduled a hearing for mid
January, at which time AT&T had to inform the court and the DOJ if it planned to
86
proceed with its deal in its current form, restructure it, or drop it completely.
Before that hearing came, AT&T had thrown in the towel. By mid December,
87
AT&T announced that it was giving up its purchase of T-Mobile. AT&T would
not—at least at this point—be returning to its Ma Bell glory days.

TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:46 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/11/att-t-mobiledeal-acquisition-federal-communications-commission-.html.
80
See Cecilia Kang, AT&T, T-Mobile File Merger Application; Q&A with James Cicconi, WASH.
POST (Apr. 12, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/atandt-tmobile-file-merger-application-qanda-with-james-cicconi/2011/04/11/AFhzCTQD_blog.html (stating
that AT&T filed its application with the DOJ on April 8, 2011 and planned to have its FCC application
filed on April 21, 2011).
81
See Greg Bensinger, AT&T Bickers with FCC on Merger Review, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577060400382853704.html
(describing
how the FCC at first resisted allowing AT&T to withdraw its application without prejudice).
82
See Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Spars With FCC Over Withdrawal of T-Mobile Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011, 7:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/25/att-spars-with-f-c-c-overwithdrawal-of-t-mobile-deal/?scp=1&sq=at&t%20fcc&st=cse.
83
Puzzanghera, supra note 79 (stating that the withdrawal can occur without prejudice but that the
FCC is going to release its report regarding the proposed merger, which finds that “the purchase was
not in the public interest”). The FCC will also share its findings with the DOJ and make its report
available to the public. Id. Because the report does not look favorably upon the AT&T deal, AT&T
understandably opposed its release. Id.
84
See Edward Wyatt, U.S. Judge Grants Delay in Challenge to AT&T Deal, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 12,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/technology/judge-grants-delay-in-challenge-to-att-merger.
html?partner=rss&emc=rss.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Nicola Leske, AT&T Drops $39 Billion Bid to Buy T-Mobile USA, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011,
6:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/19/us-att-t-mobile-idUSTRE7BI1YZ20111219; see
also Wortham, supra note 7 (discussing the $4 billion breakup fee that AT&T owed to T-Mobile as a
result of the deal’s failure).
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THESE TWO DEALS
1. Objective Factors
A. Market Share
A company’s market share is an obvious consideration for antitrust
88
regulators. Antitrust law and regulations works to preserve competition,
therefore, a company that possesses a large market share and is seeking to grow
even larger through an acquisition will obviously raise antitrust concerns. Oracle’s
market share was not nearly as large an obstacle to its purchase of PeopleSoft as
AT&T’s was to its proposed purchase of T-Mobile. The judge in Oracle made it
clear that the expert witnesses for the government were not credible or
89
persuasive. The government had attempted to narrowly define the product and
geographic market which would result in Oracle controlling a larger percentage of
90
91
the market.
The court did not accept either of these characterizations.
The
government had provided market share statistics based only on the product and
geographic market definitions that it had proposed and because the court did not
accept these product and geographic market definitions, the court did not have
market concentration statistics based on the market definitions that it had
92
ultimately accepted.
In contrast, AT&T’s market share appeared to be fairly well understood.
Numerous articles written about the proposed merger summed up the market share
division in the mobile phone market by stating that if the deal went forward, the
93
number of large mobile phone companies would decrease from four to three.
The DOJ’s complaint also argued that AT&T’s proposed purchase would
excessively increase its market share, resulting in anticompetitive effects.
Specifically, the complaint provided Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”)
calculations that indicated that the merger would produce a presumptively
94
anticompetitive market share in AT&T. In particular, the complaint alleged that
if the merger was allowed to go ahead, the HHI for the industry on a national basis

88
58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 7 (2012) (“[T]he purpose behind both state and federal antitrust law is to
protect and promote competition for the benefit of consumers.”).
89
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
90
See id. at 1148, 1162–63. The government’s expert calculated the post-merger HHI in the
industry to be 5700—well above the Guidelines’ threshold for a presumption of anticompetitive effect.
Id. at 1112, 1148.
91
See id. at 1158, 1164.
92
See id. at 1165 (“Not surprisingly, plaintiffs did not offer any market share data other than those
of Elzina [an expert witness].”).
93
See e.g., De La Merced, supra note 3 (“And the deal’s end leaves T-Mobile, the weakest of the
four national operators, with an uncertain future.”); De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2
(stating that the DOJ was arguing that the deal would harm competition by reducing the number of
national carriers from four to three); Barbagallo, supra note 1 (“If regulators define the geographic
market as national, the presumptive finding will be that a combined AT&T-T-Mobile would control a
40 percent market share and reduce the number of competitors in the market from four to three.”).
94
Second Amended Complaint at 11–12, United States v. AT&T, Inc., (D.D.C., Sep. 30, 2011)
(No. 11-CV-01560), 2011 WL 4806971.
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95

would be greater than 3,100 and increase by nearly 700.
The complaint also
reported the post-merger HHI in ninety-six of the country’s largest CMAs would
96
top 2,500.
In ninety-one of ninety-seven representative CMAs, the complaint
argued that the HHI would increase by 200 and this “increase is presumed to be
97
likely to enhance market power.” The complaint addressed separately the HHI
for business and government contracts and reported that post merger the HHI in
98
that market would be 3,400 or greater, showing an increase of at least 300. With
these calculations, the DOJ was able to show how oligopolistic the wireless phone
market is and would become with the consummation of the AT&T purchase of TMobile – especially considering that AT&T is the second largest wireless carrier in
99
the country and T-Mobile is the fourth largest. For a court, numbers like these
would be very persuasive.
In its answer to the DOJ’s complaint, AT&T admitted the HHI calculations,
but AT&T stated that the HHI calculations are only one factor in a merger
100
analysis.
AT&T also did not provide alternate HHI calculations of its own. In
101
its answer, AT&T tried to minimize the importance of HHI figures generally.
This latter statement by AT&T indicated that AT&T was aware that it was fighting
an uphill battle in regard to market concentration. By trying to take the emphasis
off of HHI figures and market concentration, AT&T was revealing that it was
aware that the market concentration numbers were a major obstacle. AT&T’s
market share fight differed drastically from Oracle’s. Against Oracle, the
government failed to persuade the court to accept its product market and
geographic market definitions. The court had no way to consider market share. In
contrast, AT&T’s market share and the concentration of the mobile phone industry
were fairly well established and likely to persuade a court should the deal have
gone to trial.
The first lesson from this comparison is that the government has to win the
battle over product market and geographic market definitions, and the defense has
to prevent the court from accepting the government’s definitions. This first stage
is crucial because it will determine how the market share calculations are
performed and market share remains a critical factor in a court’s Section 7
analysis.
B. Unilateral Effects
The next critical factor in the court’s evaluation of a merger is potential
unilateral effects. Consideration of unilateral effects has not always been a
prominent portion of merger analysis, but it has become a central element in recent

95

Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
97
Id. at 11–12.
98
Id. at 12.
99
Id. at 4–5.
100
Defendant’s Answer, supra 1, at 14–15.
101
Id. at 15 (“HHI analysis is only one factor in merger analysis, and . . . a complete analysis must
take full account of competitive dynamics and efficiencies not captured by such simplistic
calculations.”).
96
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102

years.
Unilateral effects analysis began its climb to prominence with its
103
appearance in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
In short, merger analysis
that incorporates a consideration of unilateral effects evaluates whether the merged
entity will be able to raise prices for its products without market dominance or
coordinated efforts because other entities’ products, while similar to the merged
entities’ products, are not feasible substitutes for the products of the merged entity.
For example, the H&R Block court stopped a merger between H&R Block and
TaxAct and based its ruling in part on the absence of substitute products for those
offered by H&R Block and TaxAct and on the fact that the competitors of the two
104
entities would not be likely to develop such substitutable products.
Because of
this, it was more likely that the merged entity would be able to raise its prices
independent of its competitors’ actions and without coordinating its actions with
others.
In contrast, the Oracle court found that the government had failed to show a
105
likelihood of anticompetitive unilateral effects.
After a long discussion of
106
unilateral effects analysis,
the court found that the government had failed to
show the first element of a unilateral effects argument—”plaintiffs have failed to
prove that there are a significant number of customers (the ‘node’) who regard
107
Oracle and PeopleSoft as their first and second choices.”
Because the
government had failed to show a sufficient degree of “localized competition”
between Oracle and PeopleSoft, the court did not have to take its unilateral effects
analysis any further and consider whether the merged entity would be able to raise
108
prices and reduce production irrespective of its competitors’ actions.
The
divergent outcomes in these two important cases undoubtedly influenced the
arguments relating to unilateral effects—or rather the lack of such arguments—
made in the AT&T suit.
In the case of AT&T and T-Mobile, the DOJ did not make allegations
relating to unilateral effects in its complaint. Instead, the DOJ focused on market
109
concentration.
DOJ may have chosen this approach because they felt that their
market concentration argument was strong enough to win by itself or because they

102
See Scott A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets:
Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means, 26 ANTITRUST 46, 46 (2012) (“Merger enforcement policy
has not always acknowledged the theory of unilateral effects. . . . By the time a federal court decided
Oracle in 2004, the theory of unilateral effects had become the mainstay of merger analysis at the FTC
and DOJ.”).
103
Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.2
(1992), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm (“A merger may diminish competition
even if it does not lead to increased likelihood of successful coordinated interaction, because merging
firms may find it profitable to alter their behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating
price and suppressing output.”).
104
See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81-89 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that
unilateral effects were likely as a result of the merger); Sher, supra note 102, at 48.
105
United States v. Oracle, Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“In sum, the
court finds that plaintiffs have failed to show an area of localized competition between Oracle and
PeopleSoft.”).
106
Id. at 1113–23.
107
Id. at 1172.
108
Id.
109
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 94, at 11.
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did not think they had a strong unilateral effects argument to make. DOJ likely did
not have a strong unilateral effects argument to make because the merged AT&T
and T-Mobile would have still faced stiff competition from Verizon and Sprint,
both of whom offer substitutable products to those offered by AT&T. Both offer
similar plans and identical devices—i.e. the iPhone. Therefore, it is unlikely that
AT&T would have been able to raise prices after its proposed merger independent
of the prices and products offered by its competitors. Consequently, the DOJ did
not raise the unilateral effects issue, but focused on the market concentration
110
argument.
Even though the issue did not arise in AT&T’s attempted acquisition of TMobile, the importance of unilateral effects analysis has not decreased.
Companies seeking to merge must be ready to show that their merged entity will
not be able to raise prices and reduce output independent of the actions of its
competitors because its competitors will have substitute products that will force the
merged entity to compete. Counsel for companies contemplating a merger must
continue to emphasize the importance of unilateral effects analysis and evaluate
whether the merged entity would be able to operate more like H&R Block and
TaxAct, or more like AT&T and T-Mobile, with Verizon and Sprint ready to
supply substitute products.
C. Regulated Industries Pose a Double Obstacle
In its proposed purchase of PeopleSoft, Oracle faced one main adversary—
the DOJ. In its proposed purchase of T-Mobile, AT&T faced two—the DOJ and
the FCC. Two adversaries are naturally worse than one. The DOJ brought suit to
111
stop AT&T’s purchase of T-Mobile.
In all likelihood, AT&T foresaw
112
opposition from the DOJ.
Given the size of its market share and the nature of
the mobile phone market, it is likely that AT&T expected DOJ opposition to arise
after AT&T gave notice of its proposed merger, as required by the Hart-Scott113
Rodino Act.

110
Note that although the DOJ did not raise the unilateral effects argument in its complaint, Sprint
raised it in its complaint. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 62, 64, 66, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc.,
(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-01600), 2011 WL 3891692 (making conclusory arguments that the
post-merger AT&T would be able to unilaterally raise prices).
111
De La Merced, Cane & Protess, supra note 2. Note however that both the FTC and the DOJ
have the authority to bring suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f) (2006). The
two agencies work together to decide which agency will bring a particular action. If one of the agencies
hears of possible anticompetitive activity before the other, then it may ask for “clearance” from the
other agency so that it can take action. The other factor that influences which agency will take action is
the industry in which the suspected anticompetitive activity is occurring. Both agencies have areas of
expertise and if a case arises in an agency’s area of expertise, it will probably be pursued by that
agency. Telephone Interview with Allen Freedman, Attorney with the Office of Policy & Coordination
for the Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 2, 2011).
112
However, AT&T claimed to have been blindsided by the DOJ’s suit. See Anton Troianovski,
Blindsided and Besieged, AT&T’s Lawyer Fights On, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903791504576584774123453618.html.
113
Whenever a merger of this size is proposed, the participants must notify both the DOJ and FTC
before they close the deal. This way the participants do not have a chance to scramble the eggs before
the merger can be reviewed. See Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006); AT&T,
Inc.,
Quarterly
Report
(Form
10-Q)
at
16
(May
6,
2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732717/000119312511130267/d10q.htm (“On March 31, 2011

2013

LESSONS FROM AT&T’S FLOP

209

It is less likely that AT&T anticipated all the grief that it ended up receiving
from the FCC. In April 2011, AT&T filed its application seeking the agency’s
114
approval for the deal.
In late November 2011, the FCC indicated that it wanted
115
to hold a hearing to review AT&T’s proposed purchase.
At that point, AT&T
116
requested to withdraw its application.
The FCC decided to allow AT&T to
withdraw its application without prejudice but also publicly released its report,
117
which AT&T fought.
The report “outlined the $39 billion deal’s shortcomings,”
118
focusing on why the alleged benefits of the deal would not outweigh its costs.
The combination of the FCC’s release of its report and AT&T’s withdrawal of its
119
application meant that the merger was not going to succeed.
The lesson from AT&T’s stand off with the FCC is that a larger merger is
more difficult to accomplish in a regulated industry where the deal will have to win
the blessing of not only the DOJ, but of a regulatory agency as well. Appeasing a
regulator like the FCC adds an extra burden to an acquisition. AT&T had to divert
time and resources from its fight with the DOJ to answer the FCC’s inquiries and
120
demand for additional information.
This additional opposition to the deal meant
that AT&T’s resources were spread more thinly than if AT&T had only one
agency to satisfy. Second, there is safety in numbers and it was easier for the DOJ
to strongly oppose the deal as long as the FCC was opposing it, and vice versa. As
it became apparent that AT&T was going to face double the opposition, it became
twice as hard for it to justify to shareholders its fight for T-Mobile. Fourth, once a
second government body stated its opposition to the deal, negative public
sentiment was reinforced and positive public sentiment was weakened. For these
reasons, the fact that AT&T had two opponents to its deal made it much more
difficult for it to push its deal through to completion.
In contrast, Oracle only had one main adversary with which to deal. This
allowed Oracle to focus its resources on its fight with the DOJ. Furthermore, in its
fight with Oracle, the DOJ did not have a partner against whom it could lean. DOJ

we filed with the U.S. Department of Justice notice of the transaction [the purchase of T-Mobile] as
required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act.”).
114
Quarterly Report, supra note 113, at 16
115
Amy Schatz & Greg Bensinger, FCC Blasts AT&T Deal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204449804577068562250634398.html;
see
also
Anton Troianovski, Greg Bensinger & Amy Schatz, AT&T’s T-Mobile Deal Teeters, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
25, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577057482069627186.html
(describing the hearing that the FCC was seeking as “rare”).
116
Schatz & Bensinger, supra note 115.
117
Id. (“[T]he staff report . . . gives chapter and verse on the agency’s contention that the deal isn’t
in the public interest.”).
118
F.C.C. Report Details Merger Shortcomings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/business/media/fcc-report-on-att-deal-details-mergershortcomings.html.
119
See Cecilia Kang, AT&T and T-Mobile Pull FCC Merger Application, Shift Focus to Justice
Dept. Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandtand-t-mobile-pull-fcc-merger-application-shift-focus-to-justice-deptcase/2011/11/24/gIQAs8QytN_story.html (stating that the FCC opposition to the deal created a “major
regulatory hurdle that all but ended the chances for a wireless mega-merger in the near term.”).
120
See Amy Schatz, FCC Asks AT&T for More Info on LTE, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904787404576528613428221284.html (describing a
request by the FCC for more information regarding AT&T’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile).
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did not have the benefit of FCC opposition to help stir up negative consumer
sentiment. A large company that is seeking to grow by acquisition in a regulated
industry therefore faces the additional burden of multiple heavyweight opponents.
Large scale growth by acquisition will be less likely to succeed when a company
has to appease not only the DOJ but a regulator as well.
D. Industry Trends and Their Effect on Attempts to Grow by LargeScale Acquisition
The Court also considers the trend of concentration in an industry when
121
determining whether a proposed acquisition will violate Section 7.
A district
court will not disregard the trend surrounding market share numbers, but rather
may find against a company with a low market share if that company’s industry is
experiencing a trend of concentration. This factor also cut against AT&T. The
telecommunications industry is a prime example of consolidation and
122
123
concentration.
AT&T itself has played a large role in this concentration.
Under Von’s Grocery, a court will find this industry trend toward concentration to
be a strike against a company seeking to acquire and grow in that industry.
In contrast, Oracle found itself in an industry with significantly less
concentration than the telecommunications industry. To begin, the computer
software industry is much younger than the telecommunications industry and has
124
had less of an opportunity to develop a history of concentration.
During its
early years, the high demand for software and software innovation allowed for
entry into the market of many different software producers, and thus industry
consolidation was not an issue. Lastly, entry into the software market is arguably
125
easier than entry into the mobile phone industry.
The software industry will

121

United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275–77 (1966) (“[T]he basic purpose of the
1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by keeping
a large number of small competitors in business. . . . Thus, where concentration is gaining momentum
in a market, we must be alert to carry out Congress’ intent to protect competition against everincreasing concentration through mergers.”).
122
Barney Warf, Mergers and Acquisitions in the Telecommunications Industry, 34 GROWTH &
CHANGE 321, 325 (2003) (arguing that in recent years, the telecommunications industry “witnessed an
unprecedented number of mergers and acquisitions.”).
123
From early in its history, AT&T has faced antitrust scrutiny from the DOJ. Since the 1940s, the
DOJ has periodically made allegations of monopolization against AT&T. See United States v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982). The DOJ’s claims culminated in the 1980s when
AT&T agreed to settle an ongoing suit by giving up its local telephone service providers in order to be
able to keep its national, long distance service. See id. at 141; Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson,
Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 225
(1985) (explaining that the DOJ “filed suit under Section Two of the Sherman Act challenging
American Telephone and Telegraph Company’s (AT&T) regulated monopoly. . . . AT&T formally
divested its local Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), pursuant to a consent decree ending the
government antitrust suit.”).
124
Development of business software began in the 1950s. Robert L. Glass, The First Business
Application: A Significant Milestone in Software History, 48 COMMS. ACM 25, 25–26 (Mar. 2005).
Larry Ellison did not found Oracle until 1976. David Millstone & Guhan Subramanian, Oracle v.
PeopleSoft: A Case Study, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). In contrast, the telecommunications
industry began prior to the 20th century and AT&T itself formed in 1885. See Milestones in AT&T
History, AT&T (2013), http://www.corp.att.com/history/milestones.html.
125
The Oracle court considered ease of entry in its determination that Oracle’s merger with
PeopleSoft would not lessen competition. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1134–
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always have new companies forming and competing, lowering the level of
concentration in the software industry and easing the concerns of the antitrust
126
regulators.
In contrast, entry into the mobile phone industry requires significant
initial investment and appropriate regulatory licensing approval, and this will keep
the number of new competitors low and the trend toward consolidation high.
The lesson to take away is that a company operating within an industry with
a trend toward consolidation will have a more difficult time gaining the approval
of the DOJ and antitrust regulators. A company that wants or needs to grow must
consider all the factors stacked against it before deciding to proceed with major
acquisitions. It is very likely that a company like AT&T would be better advised
to pursue growth by a method other than major acquisitions.

2. Subjective Factors
A. Risk Versus Reward: What Did Oracle Have to Lose?
Oracle’s decision to buy PeopleSoft was reactionary. It made this decision
127
after PeopleSoft announced a merger with J.D. Edwards.
It is arguable then that
Oracle did not want PeopleSoft so much as it did not want anyone else to have
them. Oracle had succeeded for a long time by growing on its own and making
128
small acquisitions.
So Oracle made a move for PeopleSoft to prevent its merger
with J.D. Edwards. It was a win-win situation for Oracle. If its bid for PeopleSoft
was successful, it would be able to grow and gain more market share; if its bid was
not successful, then its attempt would likely inhibit J.D. Edwards merger with
PeopleSoft.
In contrast, no other suitor was courting T-Mobile when AT&T announced
its desire to purchase it. AT&T’s motivation was neither reactionary nor
preventative. Rather, AT&T wanted to buy T-Mobile mainly because it wanted to
129
acquire T-Mobile’s spectrum.
Its move was proactive. All major mobile

36 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The court determined that other companies such as Microsoft would be able to
fairly easily enter the software market occupied by Oracle, PeopleSoft, and their main competitors. Id.
at 1135. Thus the court in Oracle did not consider the barriers to entry to this market to be significant.
This compares with the more difficult entry into the wireless telecommunications industry which results
from the scarcity and high price of spectrum. See Chen, supra note 1 (stating that AT&T has argued
that spectrum is in short supply and government regulators are not adequately meeting the demand).
But see Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., How AT&T Miscalculated, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204791104577110393277495270.html (arguing that
“the [spectrum] shortage is grossly overplayed.”).
126
In fact, for most of its history Oracle had grown from within, without needing to acquire other
companies in order to get larger. See Millstone & Subramanian, supra note 124, at 3–4 (“Over its first
two decades, the company had so much organic growth—doubling in size in some years—that
acquisitions were at best an afterthought. Within Oracle the conventional wisdom was that integrations
required too much management attention when so much growth could be achieved just by executing
well.”).
127
Id. at 1–2.
128
See supra text accompanying note 124.
129
See De La Merced, supra note 3 (“The company [AT&T] wanted T-Mobile’s cellular airwaves,
or spectrum, to relieve its congested network and offer faster service for data-hungry devices like the
iPhone.”).

212

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. VI: II

telecommunications companies have identified the shortage of spectrum as a
problem, and given that these companies vigorously maneuver to acquire spectrum
130
and to keep their competitors from acquiring it, it is possible that AT&T thought
that acquiring T-Mobile was worth a try. If AT&T succeeded in its bid, then it
would have acquired the spectrum it desired. If AT&T failed, then it would have
made a competitor’s acquisition of T-Mobile or another small wireless carrier
much more difficult. However, AT&T risked more in its bid for T-Mobile than
131
Oracle risked in its pursuit of PeopleSoft—$4 billion more.
After the deal fell
apart, AT&T owed T-Mobile a hefty $4 billion breakup fee. Part of this fee was
132
comprised of spectrum that AT&T had to turn over to T-Mobile.
The total
133
breakup fee was one of the biggest in corporate history.
The lesson here is obvious, but apparently worth articulating, because the
executives at AT&T missed it. A company has to weigh what it is risking against
what it stands to gain when pursuing a large-scale merger. Both AT&T and Oracle
risked time and resources by pursuing a merger, but unlike AT&T, Oracle did not
have $4 billion on the line. When attempting a large merger, a company needs to
cautiously consider what it is risking so that it does not find itself owing a large
breakup fee and having to turn over valuable resources like spectrum as a part of
that fee.
B. Good Luck and Bad Luck: The Vagaries of Litigation
Twists of fate can help push a deal forward or can stop it in its tracks, and no
matter how intelligent or talented the leaders at Oracle or AT&T are, they are not
immune from misfortune. AT&T had its share of misfortune, which contributed to
the failure of its bid for T-Mobile. There was a leaked document. In August of
2011, AT&T lawyers accidently released an unredacted copy of a letter to the
134
FCC.
The letter explained that AT&T could accomplish its extension of its
network into rural communities—one of its purported main reasons for its
acquisition of T-Mobile—at about one tenth of the price that it was willing to pay
135
136
for T-Mobile.
This revealing fact made regulators question AT&T’s motives.
Creating this distrust of its motivations hindered AT&T’s pursuit of T-Mobile.
Second, the presidential election cycle did not help AT&T as much as it
could have. It was no coincidence that AT&T chose to pursue this acquisition with
137
a presidential election on the horizon.
AT&T sought to use this upcoming

130
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22/idUS104885420720120222 (describing T-Mobile’s opposition to Verizon’s bid to buy spectrum).
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ST. J., Apr. 25, 2012, at B8, (discussing the $1 billion worth of spectrum that AT&T paid to T-Mobile
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Id.
136
See id.
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election to its advantage, and force the presidential administration to favor it—by
138
highlighting the American jobs that would be created by the deal.
With this
rhetoric, AT&T tried to gain favor for its deal and push it through during an
election year when President Barack Obama was undoubtedly concerned about
how the White House was perceived by the American business community.
AT&T’s job-creation projections, however, were questioned and called into doubt
139
when AT&T provided unsatisfactory answers.
As a result, the FCC came to
140
believe that the deal would actually cause a loss of American jobs.
Unfortunately AT&T miscalculated President Obama’s administration’s
response to its proposed purchase of T-Mobile. Instead of kowtowing to the
corporate giant during an election year due to insecurities about the American
economy and unemployment rate, the Administration pushed back against the
141
deal.
As with the document it leaked to the FCC, this was probably bad luck for
AT&T. The lesson, then, is that fortune can play a role in the success or failure of
a deal like this one. Although it may not play a big role, the leaders of companies
should expect bouts of bad luck as they pursue acquisitions, and they need to be
ready to deal with these bouts.
C. Media Coverage and Consumer Sentiment
AT&T had more working against it than the government regulators. In
142
addition, media coverage and consumer sentiment worked against AT&T’s deal.
Not every proposed merger draws the focus of the American public or the media.
The AT&T deal gained atypical, widespread media attention as well as attention
143
from the general public.
Not only was the business community watching the
deal—cell phone users were too. Undoubtedly the widespread media attention that
the deal drew was due in part to most Americans’ familiarity with these companies
144
and use of their products. Not only do most people use cellular phones, but

(Nov. 28, 2011, 1:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/idUS356503073020111128
(describing how a Republican administration would help AT&T push its purchase forward).
138
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2011),
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See De La Merced, supra note 2 (referring to President Obama’s administration’s opposition to
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2011),
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many people use AT&T and T-Mobile cellular phones. This meant that many
people felt connected to the merger and took an interest in it. This fact led to
considerable media coverage of AT&T’s bid to buy T-Mobile.
If the coverage and the news had been positive, then that would have cut in
145
favor of AT&T, but most of the news was negative.
The resulting effect was
that consumers’ opinions regarding the deal were often negative, which in turn led
to additional negative media coverage. A cycle of negative media coverage and
negative consumer reaction began to weigh down AT&T’s proposed purchase. In
contrast, Oracle’s bid for PeopleSoft received substantially less media attention.
This, no doubt, is a result of most people’s greater familiarity with AT&T and TMobile. Although many companies use Oracle and PeopleSoft products, these two
entities do not have the brand name recognition of AT&T and T-Mobile. There is
less general interest in a story about a merger between these two entities because
even though a merger would affect a large number of people—employees of
companies who use either Oracle or PeopleSoft software—many people would not
even be aware that this merger deal would affect them. This means that companies
like Oracle and PeopleSoft can worry less about media coverage and instead focus
more on making their case to government regulators, not the American public.
The lesson from this evaluation of the media coverage and consumer
sentiment surrounding AT&T’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile is that when a
large scale merger is going to affect a large number of consumers who are familiar
with the companies involved, the deal will attract a good deal of media attention
and public attention. If that attention is positive, then that can help the deal move
forward. If the attention is negative, this negative reaction will impede the deal.
Company leaders need to be ready to promote a positive public reception to these
large-scale deals. If a company can create a positive reception for its deal, the
chances of success for the deal will increase.
D. Emotion: AT&T’s Winning History May Have Clouded Its
Judgment
146

AT&T had faced DOJ antitrust complaints in the past.
More importantly,
AT&T had a history of winning these disputes with the DOJ and continuing to
147
prosper and expand.
Having this history of positive outcomes relating to DOJ
antitrust litigation may have created a feeling of invincibility in AT&T. The
company’s leaders may have believed, incorrectly, that they had favorably settled
these disputes in the past and they would be able to do so again. Unfortunately for
AT&T, this time they did not reach a favorable settlement with the DOJ. Rather,

5 billion throughout the rest of the world.”).
145
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they abandoned their purchase and as a result owed a $4 billion breakup fee to T148
Mobile.
AT&T’s past litigation success may have blinded them to the failure
that awaited them on this deal.
By contrast, Oracle did not have a winning history regarding battles with
149
This fact quite possibly put Oracle in a better position than
antitrust regulators.
AT&T, when it came time to meet the DOJ’s antitrust allegations. Oracle did not
have a history of battling and persevering against the DOJ, and Oracle did not
150
underestimate the DOJ.
This in turn may have led Oracle to succeed against the
DOJ where AT&T has now failed. The lesson here is that a company needs to
objectively view its chances for success for each individual deal it pursues. When
a company has a history of success in antitrust litigation it is possible for it to
develop a feeling of invincibility. This feeling may well cause it to overestimate
its chances for success. This in turn will cause it to waste resources—time, money,
and talent—pursuing deals that are not likely to succeed.
V. HOW TO GROW IN THIS REGULATORY CLIMATE
1. Make Smaller Acquisitions
Large acquisitions—like the one AT&T just attempted—are costly. Not
151
only did AT&T have to pay out a $4 billion breakup fee to T-Mobile, it also lost
time and other resources while pursuing this deal. When companies attempt big
acquisitions they spend key employee time and talent, and they also risk losing
quality employees who do not want to wait around to find out if they will have a
152
job post-merger or what their new role will be after the merger succeeds.
A
company needs to carefully weigh the total cost of attempting a merger or
acquisition.
An alternative to a large-scale merger that is more likely to succeed and have
a lower overall cost is a series of small acquisitions. A smaller purchase is less
likely to draw the scrutiny of antitrust regulators due to the low market
concentrations. Any associated breakup fee will also likely be lower, thus easing
the penalty if the deal fails to reach completion. Third, the associated costs such as

148

See Wortham, supra note 7 (discussing AT&T’s $4 billion breakup fee).
See supra text accompanying note 125.
150
Additionally, the personalities of the leaders at Oracle and AT&T, Larry Ellison and Wayne
Watts respectively, may have been a factor in Oracle’s success and AT&T’s failure. Larry Ellison is a
“brilliant and fiercely competitive college dropout.” Millstone & Subramanian, supra note 124, at 3.
He has been quoted as saying, “It is not sufficient that I succeed; all others must fail.” Id. (quoting
Andrew Pollack, Fast-Growth Oracle Systems Confronts First Downturn, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/10/business/fast-growth-oracle-systems-confronts-firstdownturn.html). By contrast, Wayne Watts is more methodical. See Watt’s Happening; As General
Counsel of AT&T, Wayne Watts Instills a “We are One” Culture Among his Team and Clients,
INSIDECOUNSEL (Nov. 2009) (describing Watts’ method for managing the AT&T legal department).
Furthermore, Watts has been at AT&T since 1983, and therefore has seen AT&T’s litany of successes
against the DOJ’s antitrust complaints. See id.
151
Wortham, supra note 7 (discussing AT&T’s $4 billion breakup fee).
152
Kelley Holland, Life After a Merger: Learning on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/business/yourmoney/24mgmt.html (discussing the danger of
losing key employees once a merger is proposed).
149

216

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. VI: II

talent drain and time consumption will likely be lower due to: (1) employees will
be less skittish regarding a small acquisition as opposed to a big acquisition or
merger and (2) smaller deals will likely taken less time to complete.
Oracle now appears to be operating under this model. Soon after AT&T’s
bid for T-Mobile fell apart, Oracle agreed to purchase a relatively small company
153
called Taleo, which produces online-based software, for $1.9 billion.
Additionally, in the fall of 2011, Oracle announced its intent to purchase cloud154
computing company RightNow Technologies for $1.43 billion.
Both of these
acquisitions were relatively small. Neither of them has drawn near the antitrust
scrutiny that AT&T’s attempted purchase of T-Mobile did. Additionally, the deals
likely have not cost Oracle as much near the time and money as AT&T’s attempted
purchase of T-Mobile cost it. Lastly, the deal for RightNow Technologies has
gone through and the deal for Taleo will likely go through as well, meaning that
Oracle has avoided the risk of paying out a costly breakup fee.
Juxtaposing AT&T’s attempted purchase of T-Mobile and Oracle’s recent
purchases of these two smaller companies reveals that smaller is likely better. A
company wishing to grow can make multiple smaller acquisitions, as Oracle is
doing, to achieve similar growth results. A company employing this strategy risks
less because each deal is more likely to succeed and will have lower resource and
talent costs.
2. Get Creative with Structure
There are other ways to grow without running afoul of antitrust regulations.
Many companies are avoiding the complications of mergers and acquisitions, and
instead opting for joint ventures and combined marketing agreements. A prime
example is Verizon’s proposed plan to purchase spectrum from various cable
155
companies.
The deal calls for a joint-marketing agreement between Verizon and
156
Comcast, wherein the two companies will promote each other’s products.
Far
from attempting to purchase a national mobile phone company like T-Mobile and
thus further concentrating market share in the mobile telecommunications industry,
Verizon is only buying what it wants—spectrum—from cable companies who are
157
not even using it.
Admittedly, Verizon’s proposed purchase is drawing some antitrust
158
This deal is smaller however and involves mainly just the sale of an
attention.
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asset and not the sale of a whole company, meaning it is more likely that this deal
will succeed, providing Verizon with the asset it needs to maintain its position in
the mobile telecommunications industry. Examples of creative structure exist
outside the telecommunications industry as well. Comcast recently completed a
joint venture with NBC Universal. In January of 2011, Comcast received approval
159
from the FCC and the DOJ to purchase 51% of NBC Universal.
After a year of
regulator review and a DOJ suit to stop the joint venture, Comcast and the DOJ
160
reached a settlement that allowed the deal to go forward.
Comcast agreed to
certain restrictions that the DOJ imposed in order to maintain competition in the
161
media industry.
This Comcast success came despite the fact that both Comcast
162
and NBC Universal are huge players in the media industry.
Although the media market is not identical to the mobile telecommunications
market, Comcast’s successful deal with NBC Universal still provides a valuable
comparison to AT&T’s attempt to buy T-Mobile. The fact that two large
companies were able to successfully see their deal through to completion while
still getting what they wanted, and without having to withstand a drawn out
antitrust trial, demonstrates that successful combinations can be done. The lesson
is that large companies like AT&T, T-Mobile, Comcast, and NBC Universal need
to think creatively. Antitrust regulators will more fervently resist a full-scale
acquisition compared to a more limited combination such as a joint venture.
Companies that want to combine forces need to be willing to consider alternatives
to a full merger.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
AT&T’s failed attempt to buy T-Mobile provides valuable lessons for
companies wanting to grow while avoiding Section 7 scrutiny. The costs for largescale acquisitions are high, and they get even higher when the deals fall through
and the would-be acquirer owes a large breakup fee. In order to minimize these
risks and still obtain the benefits that growth can provide, companies need to
consider growing via a series of smaller acquisitions or structuring their
combinations as joint ventures rather than as mergers. Companies like Oracle,
Verizon, and Comcast have already begun to employ these strategies that allow
them to grow without wasting excessive time and money pursuing large-scale
mergers that fail.
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